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From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice1 is a highly compelling 
and thoughtful work on an important issue.  Some of the best minds in 
bioethics, each of whom writes from a distinct perspective, have come 
together to produce it.2  Its publication is quite timely, as we are already 




 *  Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1. ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 
(2000). 
 2. The authors of the book are Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels, 
and Daniel Wikler. 
 3. Thus far, most of the clinically viable interventions have been drug therapies 
and diagnostic tests based on genetics research.  See generally Arti K. Rai, The 
Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, 
Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173 (2001). 
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Much of the existing literature on genetic intervention addresses 
questions of discrimination or reproductive decisionmaking.  Although 
this book discusses those questions,4 it takes as its major focus an issue 
that is perhaps even more vexing—the issue of how we should, from the 
standpoint of distributive justice, allocate genetic interventions.  In other 
words, given the wide range of genetic interventions that may become 
available, how should we divide such interventions?  Implicit in this 
problem is the reality that scarcity will prevent individuals from having 
access to all genetic interventions that would be of benefit to them.  In 
this brief Essay, I take issue with some of the proposals that the authors 
put forward in chapters 3 and 4, specifically their argument that 
distributing genetic interventions—and, more generally, health care5—in 
a manner that restores individuals to normal, or “species typical,” 
functioning will preserve equality of opportunity and hence respond 
adequately to our distributive justice dilemmas.6 
I.  SOME BACKGROUND ON RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Distributive justice concerns have long pervaded health care.  In the 
early 1980s, well before the advent of most therapies based on genetic 
research, a Presidential Bioethics Advisory Commission issued a series 
of comprehensive reports on the question of how to respond adequately 
to distributive justice concerns.7  Although the Commission’s members 
were divided on many issues, one theme of agreement was that all 
individuals should receive care that is “adequate”8 or meets some sort of 
“decent minimum.”9  Indeed, most commentators on health care 
 
 4. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 27–60 (discussing discrimination); id. 
at 204–57 (discussing reproductive decisionmaking). 
 5. Genetic interventions are clearly part of health care more generally.  They 
simply represent interventions that emerge from a different mode of investigation than 
other health care.  For example, in the case of many proteins that serve as drugs, the very 
same protein could be manufactured either through genetic recombinant DNA techniques 
or through nongenetic techniques that extract and purify the naturally occurring protein.  
Although there is no reason—at least from the standpoint of justice—to distinguish 
genetics-based health care from other health care, what the authors rightly recognize is 
that the genetically-oriented mode of investigation is emerging as the dominant paradigm 
in health care research and delivery.  See id. at 16.  They also recognize that the expense 
and scope of genetic interventions that may become available will further increase the 
tension between access and cost.  See id. at 96–97, 99. 
 6. Id. at 73–75, 109. 
 7. See, e.g., 1 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 
(1983). 
 8. Id. at 3–6, 18–47. 
 9. Allan Gibbard, The Prospective Pareto Principle and Equity of Access to 
Health Care, in 2 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. 
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resource allocation dilemmas tend to agree on the adequate care 
standard.10  The adequate care standard can be justified from the 
standpoint of several different ethical perspectives.  In their previous 
works, two authors of this book, Allen Buchanan and Norman Daniels, 
have justified the standard in two quite different ways.  In Buchanan’s 
view, alleviating the misery caused by lack of adequate health care is an 
obligation of beneficence that can, and should, be enforced through 
collective contribution to the provision of health care.11  By contrast, 
from Daniels’s perspective, which is highly influenced by the work of 
John Rawls,12 society must provide adequate health care services in 
order to secure for its citizens a “normal opportunity range,”13 and 
hence, fair equality of opportunity.14 
While Buchanan’s account justifies adequate care, it does not provide 
a mechanism for defining the content of such care.15 Daniels’ account is 
more robust in that it provides not only justification but also content.  
Perhaps not surprisingly then, the authors adopt the equality of 
opportunity account16 in determining what genetic interventions society 
should provide to all individuals.  However, as they point out, equality 
of opportunity is a concept that is susceptible to a number of different 
interpretations.17  Equality of opportunity could be seen as simply 
requiring the elimination of barriers to opportunity for persons of similar 
 
& BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 153 
(1983) [hereinafter 2 SECURING ACCESS]; David Gauthier, Unequal Need: A Problem of 
Equity in Access to Health Care, in 2 SECURING ACCESS, supra, at 179; Allen Buchanan, 
The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, in 2 SECURING ACCESS, supra, at 207.    
 10. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS 356 (4th ed. 1994) (noting that the idea of an individual right to a decent 
minimum of health care could be a point of “compromise among libertarians, utilitarians, 
communitarians, and egalitarians”). 
 11. See generally Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health 
Care, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 55 (1984) (suggesting that the provision of adequate health 
care is a public good, to which all citizens should be required to contribute).  
 12. Rawls argues that individuals under a veil of ignorance as to their personal 
characteristics (for example, social status or natural distribution of abilities) would 
contract to form a society with institutions that guaranteed fair equality of opportunity.  
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302–03 (1971). 
 13. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 39–42 (1985). 
 14. See id. at 36–58. 
 15. In fact, Buchanan has explicitly noted that his beneficence-based approach will 
not yield answers as to content.  He has argued that, as contrasted with rights, duties of 
beneficence are “not precisely delineated.”  Buchanan, supra note 11, at 77. 
 16. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 63–65. 
 17. Id. at 65. 
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talents and abilities.18  Alternatively, it could be seen as requiring not 
only the elimination of barriers but also affirmative intervention to 
eliminate the effects of “bad luck.”19  One version of the bad luck 
approach, which the authors term the “social structural” view, requires 
redressing the bad luck that results from unjust social structures.20  
Another, more expansive version, which Thomas Scanlon terms the 
“brute luck” view,21 requires redressing all bad luck, whether its origin is 
social or natural.22 
The authors adopt an account of equality of opportunity that falls 
somewhere between the social structural and brute luck approaches.23  
The authors’ account, which Daniels has developed in detail in previous 
work (and which the authors argue is most congruent with the Rawlsian 
approach),24 holds that justice requires counteracting those conditions, 
whether natural or social, that prevent one from being a “normal 
competitor” for desirable social position.25  However, according to the 
authors, conditions that prevent such normal competition are generally 
limited to those inequalities that could be considered diseases.26  The 
authors argue that the brute luck alternative, which would focus not 
simply on disease but on all inequalities,27 would be highly inefficient 
because it would insist on an equalizing of the distribution of natural 
talents and skills.28  In rejecting the brute luck approach, the authors 
endorse a conception of justice that focuses on treating disease29 and thus 
support “a qualified and limited defense of the treatment/enhancement 
distinction.”30 
The problem with the authors’ account of how health care distribution 
should be structured to address equality of opportunity concerns is that it 
is both overinclusive and underinclusive.  On the one hand, from the 
standpoint of efficiency, the authors’ account does not adequately limit 
the services society needs to provide all individuals.  On the other hand, 
the account draws a distinction between disease and other conditions—
and, correspondingly, between treatment and enhancement—that is, by 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 66–67. 
 21. Id. at 67 (citing Thomas M. Scanlon, A Good Start: Reply to Roomer, BOSTON 
REV., No. 20(2) 1989, at 8–9). 
 22. See id. at 67–68. 
 23. See id. at 73. 
 24. See id. at 73–74. 
 25. See id. at 73–75. 
 26. See id. at 74. 
 27. See id. at 67, 75. 
 28. See id. at 75, 128. 
 29. See id. at 74. 
 30. Id. at 109. 
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the authors’ own admission, slippery at best.31  Moreover, despite their 
significant reservations about the value of the distinction between 
treatment and enhancement,32 the authors use it to exclude enhancements 
that might well further equality of opportunity more directly than many 
so-called treatments.33 
II.  OVERINCLUSIVENESS 
Consider first the manner in which the authors’ account is 
overinclusive.  Given scarcity, the account is overinclusive even if we do 
not consider genetic interventions.  Many of the expensive interventions 
that our society cannot afford for all individuals—neonatal intensive 
care for extremely premature newborns, organ transplantation, and 
intensive treatment for individuals in the last stages of life—could be 
seen as restoring normal functioning.  Even in our current health care 
economy, in which genetics-based interventions are just beginning to 
emerge, we face a situation in which we spend far more per capita on 
health care than any other industrialized country and nonetheless 
manage to leave uninsured a large number of citizens.  The issue of 
scarcity receives little treatment in the authors’ discussion.  They address 
scarcity only in their observation that limited resources will “require[ ] 
that we meet the most important needs first, leaving people to fend for 
themselves in meeting less important medical needs.”34  The authors fail 
to elaborate on how we should go about developing the requisite 
hierarchy of needs.  For example, is using a given sum of money to 
extend the life of a cancer patient by a few years more or less important 
than using the same sum of money to provide free vaccinations to a 
group of schoolchildren?  Notably, in previous work, Daniels has 
acknowledged the inability of the normal functioning framework to 
serve as a tool for developing a hierarchy of needs.  He has admitted that 
the normal functioning approach “does not tell us which opportunities to 
protect when scarcity prevents us from equally protecting everyone’s.”35 
With genetics-based therapies, the scarcity dilemma is likely to 
 
 31. See id. at 71–72, 119. 
 32. See id. at 108, 110. 
 33. See id. at 129. 
 34. Id. at 120. 
 35. Norman Daniels, Liberalism and Medical Ethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 
Nov.–Dec. 1992, at 41, 42.  In some of his work, Daniels has advocated the alternative of 
a procedural approach towards scarcity concerns.  See infra note 53. 
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become ever more formidable.  As we develop new genetics-based 
interventions, many previously untreatable conditions will become 
treatable.  As a consequence, we will have the technical capacity to 
restore many more individuals to normal functioning for longer periods 
of time.  However, using this technical capacity will entail large costs, 
particularly as the demographic distribution of the population shifts 
towards the older end of the spectrum. 
III.  UNDERINCLUSIVENESS: WHY EXCLUDE ENHANCEMENTS? 
While the authors’ account of adequate care is overinclusive in its 
failure to address scarcity issues, it is underinclusive in its exclusion of 
treatments for conditions that are not diseases.  To be sure, the authors’ 
general exclusion of nondisease conditions comes with many caveats.  
For instance, the authors admit that the distinction between what 
constitutes a disease and what does not is a slippery one.36  They give the 
example of two short individuals, one who is short by virtue of a growth 
hormone deficiency caused by a brain tumor, and the other who is short 
because his parents are short.37  Conventionally, the individual whose 
shortness was caused by the brain tumor would be considered to have a 
disease while the other individual would simply be considered short.38  
In both cases, however, height, or lack thereof, is a function of one’s 
genes.39  Thus, it could plausibly be argued that the two cases should be 
treated similarly for purposes of insurance coverage.40 
The authors also note that what represents a disease may change if, 
through genetic enhancement of normal human function, we revise 
upward our conception of normal function.41  For example, if most 
individuals were to receive a genetic enhancement that allowed them to 
be immune to the common cold, then lack of immunity to the common 
cold could come to be seen as a disease.42  The authors also allow that a 
commitment to equality of opportunity might require medical intervention to 
counteract natural inequalities that are not adverse departures from 
normal species functioning but that nonetheless seriously limit an 
individual’s opportunities.43  In fact, the authors even indicate that “we 
[c]ould come to reclassify as a disease any correctable genetic condition 
that has a significant adverse impact on equality, because we would 
 
 36. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 71–72, 119. 
 37. Id. at 115. 
 38. See id. at 118. 
 39. See id. at 116–17. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. at 98–99. 
 42. See id. at 99. 
 43. Id. at 74. 
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come to regard it as an adverse departure from normal functioning.”44 
Despite all of these concessions, the authors persist in their claim that 
the scope of adequate care should be limited to diseases and treatments for 
those diseases.45  But their loyalty to the category of disease is misguided.  
If conditions that have a “significant adverse impact on equality”46 can be 
reclassified as diseases, then the distinction between disease and 
nondisease simply serves to detract attention from the central issue of 
equality.  Rather than engaging in distracting semantic exercises, we 
should instead focus directly on equality in the first instance.  We could, 
for example, rank all conditions directly on an “effect on equality of 
opportunity” metric.  If a nondisease condition had a more profound effect 
on equality of opportunity than a disease, it would be addressed before the 
disease that had a less profound effect.  Thus, for instance, if an individual 
could receive either physical therapy treatment for an old knee injury or an 
enhancement that would improve her below average—but nonetheless 
within the “nondiseased” region of the bell curve—analytical ability by 
ten percent,47 the enhancement might win out over the treatment. 
In defending their focus on disease, the authors argue that it is unlikely 
that there are a large number of conditions that do not qualify as diseases 
that nonetheless seriously limit equality of opportunity.48  However, if 
conditions that seriously impact equality of opportunity can be 
reclassified as diseases, then that argument is largely true simply as a 
matter of definition.  Thus, in the future, certain limits on cognitive 
ability that are currently considered normal—poor memory, limited 
analytical ability, and deficient mathematical ability—might well be 
considered diseases.  The authors’ pragmatic defense of the distinction 
between treatment and enhancement, that it provides some limitation on 
medical spending, is also unpersuasive.49  Any distinction, no matter 
how arbitrary, can serve to limit spending.  For example, drawing an 
arbitrary distinction between illnesses that affect organs other than the 
brain and illnesses that affect the brain, and excluding coverage of the 
latter, would also limit spending.  Yet it would not be defensible as a 
matter of justice. 
 
 44. Id. at 101. 
 45. See id. at 17, 129. 
 46. Id. at 101. 
 47. The usual caveats regarding our inability to intervene with such precision 
apply. 
 48. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 74. 
 49. See id. at 112–13. 
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IV.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
In some respects, attacking any proposed system for health care 
distribution is far too easy.  The distributive justice issues raised by 
health care are sufficiently complex that all proposals will have 
significant drawbacks.  Those who criticize, as I have done, are 
therefore obliged to offer suggestions that have fewer drawbacks than 
the objects of their attack.  In what follows, I offer a few such 
suggestions. 
As a logical matter, if we are serious about equality of opportunity, 
then we should be concerned not only with diseases but with any 
limitations on opportunity that could be alleviated through medical 
intervention.  In other words, we should adopt something closer to the 
brute luck approach50 than to the authors’ interpretation of equality of 
opportunity.51  The obvious difficulty with this logically consistent 
approach is that it provides no resource limitation at all.  As the authors 
rightly note, the brute luck approach is difficult to reconcile with any 
reasonable concern about efficiency.52 
An alternative approach that is frequently used to resolve distributive 
justice dilemmas is the democratic political process.  In theory, the 
democratic political process provides a procedurally just way of 
mediating different substantive conceptions of equality.  Thus we could 
decide to have either a politically determined definition of adequate care 
or a political determination of the level of subsidy individuals should 
receive to buy health care.53  But democratic political procedures are 
hardly a panacea, especially if we are concerned in any way about 
normative standards such as equality of opportunity.  For example, the 
political process might produce a minimum that was so unsatisfactory 
that a majority of the population would use their own funds to buy out of 
the minimum.  In that case, we would have reason to be concerned that 
the minimum did not sufficiently protect any plausible conception of 
equality of opportunity.  Thus, it would be important to ensure that the 
minimum was sufficiently high that a large percentage of people were 
not buying their way out. 
Of course, equality of opportunity can be furthered not simply by 
 
 50. See id. at 67. 
 51. See id. at 73–75. 
 52. See id. at 73–77. 
 53. See generally Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015 (1997).  Indeed, some of 
Norman Daniels’s work has advocated a political approach towards distributive justice in 
health care.  See Norman Daniels & James Sabin, Limits to Health Care: Fair 
Procedures, Democratic Deliberation, and the Legitimacy Problems for Insurers, 26 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 303 (1997).  
FINALRAI.DOC 2/11/2020  11:22 AM 
[VOL. 39:  657, 2002]  Genetic Interventions 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 665 
ensuring a robust floor of adequate care but also by placing a ceiling on 
the care that individuals can buy.  Indeed, the authors note that if access 
to certain “enhancements according to ability to pay exacerbated 
existing unjust inequalities, justice might require . . . that they . . . not be 
available at all.”54  Flatly limiting the purchase of enhancements would, 
however, significantly reduce autonomy.  In addition, flat limitations on 
certain types of highly desirable enhancements would probably not be 
administrable, and the likelihood of black markets and other limit-
defying behavior would be high. 
Although a ban on enhancements is probably not desirable, regulation 
could be used to dissuade individuals from pursuing certain types of 
enhancement.  In thinking of how government policy should treat 
enhancement, it is important to distinguish between two different types.  
One type is the purely positional enhancement.55  A good example of a 
purely positional enhancement is increased height.  Height is valuable 
for an individual only in relation to the height of others.  Studies have 
shown, for example, that taller people, particularly taller men, are 
perceived as more attractive than shorter people and thus tend to be more 
successful.  But greater height produces no net gain for the society as a 
whole.  It matters little for social progress whether the average height of 
the human species is four feet or ten feet.56 
In contrast with purely positional enhancements, there are some 
enhancements that have both positional and absolute value.  These also 
tend to be enhancements with respect to which an enhancement race 
would produce positive externalities.  An example of such an 
enhancement is intelligence.  Arguably, if the human species were ten 
percent more intelligent, on average, than it currently is, we would all be 
better off.  Indeed, under Rawls’s difference principle,57 inequalities in 
intelligence should be accepted to the extent that these differences 
redound to the benefit of the least well off.58 
 
 54. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 98. 
 55. See id. at 155. 
 56. See Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 639, 651–52 (1999) (discussing body size as a positional trait without associated 
positive externalities). 
 57. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 68 (discussing the difference principle). 
 58. See id. at 128, 132.  Inequalities in intelligence are likely to redound to the 
benefit of the least well off because greater intelligence tends to produce greater wealth.  
Greater wealth can redound to the benefit of the least well off either through the market, 
in the form of job creation, or through government regulation, in the form of wealth 
transfers. 
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To be sure, there is no bright line distinction between purely positional 
enhancements and enhancements that produce positive externalities.  For 
example, it is not clear how enhancements to athletic prowess should be 
classified.  It could be argued that athletic prowess is purely positional.  
Alternatively, it could be argued that athletic prowess has absolute 
value: an across-the-board increase in athletic prowess that yielded no 
positional advantage might nonetheless produce positive externalities in 
the form of greater pleasure to spectators or utility for the participants 
themselves.  Discussion of any particular enhancement should therefore 
focus on where the enhancement falls on the spectrum between absolute 
value and purely positional value. 
Government regulation should take a different approach to purely 
positional enhancements than it does to enhancements that produce positive 
externalities.  For example, high taxes could be imposed on purely 
positional enhancements.  By contrast, with respect to enhancements that 
produce positive externalities, there could be lower taxation, or perhaps 
even subsidization.  Educational interventions might represent another 
approach.  We could have educational campaigns dissuading individuals 
from seeking artificial enhancements in height or other purely positional 
attributes.59  These campaigns might focus on the risks, both to human 
health and to the social fabric, associated with such enhancements.60  The 
effect of such campaigns should not be underestimated.  For example, 
regulatory efforts to educate consumers about the negative health effects of 
smoking have had an impact in reducing smoking levels.61   
Finally, it bears mention that certain preventive genetic interventions 
have the potential to reduce rather than increase the cost of health care.  
For example, to the extent that somatic or germ line intervention can 
prevent certain diseases from occurring in the first instance, the cost of 
treatment for the disease can be avoided.  Government policy should 
strongly encourage these preventive measures by including them in the 
basic care package received by all individuals.  We could also encourage 
the purchase of such preventive care by eliminating public funding for 
the treatment of diseases that could have been alleviated, or even 
altogether averted, by the use of timely preventive care.  Whether such 
measures should be forced on individuals who are reluctant to take them 
on their own behalf or on behalf of their current or future children poses 
 
 59. See Huang, supra note 56, at 655 (discussing taxation and educational 
approaches). 
 60. Of course, to the extent an enhancement created a risk substantially in excess 
of any conceivable benefit, regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug 
Administration would be obliged under current law to ban such enhancements. 
 61. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 943, 1025–1034 (1995). 
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an interesting question.62  Although coercion with respect to risky or 
highly invasive interventions would pose too great a challenge to 
autonomy, other interventions might be of minimal risk and potentially 
of great benefit.  Indeed, it is conceivable that some interventions might 
come to be seen as analogous to vaccinations, which for reasons of 
safeguarding the public health or promoting the best interests of minors, 
































 62. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 77–78. 
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